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ABSTRACT
This contribution examines how feminist economists have conceptualized sex
work and trafficking through the lens of agency and stigma. The ongoing
debate about legalization has focused on sex workers’ agency and choice,
and on the role of stigma in shaping the supply of and demand for sex
work. Building on the analysis advanced by contributions to this special
issue, this study contends that theoretical and policy debates about sex work
are dominated by false dichotomies of agency and stigma. It argues that
the relationship between stigma and agency operates along a continuum
of contractual arrangements that underpins a high degree of segmentation
in the industry. The higher the stigma, the lower tends to be the agency.
Current policies toward sex work therefore need reconsideration – especially
mounting support for criminalization of clients, which, by increasing stigma, is
likely to detract from the agency and the well-being of sex workers, however
unintentionally.
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BACKGROUND AND MOTIVATION
In 2016, France revised its legislation on sex work. The French Parliament
passed law 2016–444, which makes it illegal to pay for sex and imposes
fines for clients up to nearly 4,000 euros. Moreover, convicted clients are
required to attend classes where they are lectured about the conditions
faced by prostitutes (known in the United States as John schools; see
Shively et al. [2012]). With the French Parliament giving its assent, France
joined the group of European countries adopting the so-called “Swedish
approach” to policies on sex for pay. To date the group includes Norway,
Iceland, and Northern Ireland, but other countries are expected to follow
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– for instance, the Baltic countries. The ultimate goal of Swedish-style
legislation is to eradicate sex for pay – which not by chance is termed
“prostitution” – by gradually curbing demand from (mostly male) clients
without, however, penalizing the sex workers. On the assumption that less
paid sex also means less trafficking, supporters of the Swedish model trust
that, should countries worldwide share the criminalization of clients, this
would also, and necessarily, lead to the gradual eradication of trafficking in
human beings for sexual exploitation (Hughes 2000).
We may be willing to consider as benignly utopic the view that
criminalization of clients on a world scale would eradicate sex for pay
and trafficking. In a similarly benign spirit, we may hope that the attempt
to tackle sex work from the demand side empowers sex workers, since
they no longer fear to be criminalized if they resort to the police when
a client turns nasty. We may also recognize that the experience of
countries having introduced criminalization is producing useful evidence
on the comparative effectiveness of a demand-side approach vis à vis
traditional supply-side policies, including legalizing or decriminalizing sex
for pay. Yet, there is something worrying in the debates and the policy
process that has led France and other countries to experiment with the
Swedish model.
It was as part of this same process that the Committee on Women’s
Rights and Gender Equality urged the European Parliament to back the so-
called Honeyball resolution, which credits the “Nordic Model” for having
curbed both sex for pay and trafficking, and dismisses the solution of
“looking upon prostitution as legal ‘sex work’ [and] decriminalising the
sex industry” (European Parliament 2014: Points 34, 37). The resolution
was eventually adopted in February 2014. Although it is not binding, it
formally establishes the EU’s stance on prostitution and puts pressure
on member states to reevaluate their policies on sex work. While the
resolution justifiably advocates additional policy efforts and financial
resources to fight trafficking for sexual exploitation, careful reading of the
text raises concerns that it may contribute to what Ronald Weitzer (2009)
called the social construction of a moral crusade against prostitution.
The following excerpts from the text of the resolution may justify
concern:
B. . . . whereas prostitution is a form of slavery incompatible with
human dignity and fundamental human rights; C. whereas trafficking
of persons, particularly women and children, for sexual as well as
other forms of exploitation is one of the most egregious violations
of human rights; . . . E. whereas prostitution and forced prostitution
are intrinsically linked to gender inequality in society . . . O. whereas
the prostitution markets fuel trafficking in women and children . . . W.
whereas there is a difference between ‘forced’ and ‘voluntary’
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prostitution; . . . 4. Acknowledges, however, that the lack of reliable,
accurate and comparable data among countries, owing mainly to the
illegal and often invisible nature of prostitution and trafficking . . . 13.
Stresses that the normalisation of prostitution has an impact on
violence against women; points in particular to data that show that men
buying sex were more likely to commit sexually coercive acts against
women and other acts of violence against women, and often presented
misogynist attitudes; . . . 34. Believes that looking upon prostitution
as legal ‘sex work’, decriminalising the sex industry in general and
making procuring legal is not a solution to keeping vulnerable women
and under-age females safe from violence and exploitation, but has
the opposite effect and puts them in danger of a higher level of
violence, while at the same time encouraging prostitution markets –
and thus the number of women and under-age females suffering abuse
– to grow; . . . 35. Condemns any policy attempt or discourse based on
the notion that prostitution can be a solution for migrant women in
Europe. (European Parliament 2014)
The Committee on Women’s Rights and Gender Equality played a
key role in ensuring adoption of such an overt abolitionist stance by
the European Parliament. Success was achieved also thanks to effective
collaboration with the European Women’s Lobby, the largest European
umbrella network of women’s associations with an avowed feminist
perspective and a mission to pursue women’s rights and gender equality.
Sweden’s ability to actively promote its policies and model within EU
institutions has also been credited for having contributed to the adoption
of the resolution (Svanström 2017).
Despite being backed by two important European institutions with a
feminist agenda, statements like those in the above excerpt beg important
questions: is prostitution (to use the wording of the resolution) always
a form of slavery? Is it an intrinsic form of violence against women,
implying that there can be no agency in sex work? Are legalization and
decriminalization means to systematically increase exposure of women
to sex work, hence to violence? And, we may add, while it may be
unacceptable that sex work is viewed as a “solution” for migrant women,
is it appropriate to equate migrant sex workers and trafficked sex
workers? Is legalization of sex work just a smokescreen behind which
sex work and trafficking thrive? Finally, does victimizing sex workers and
criminalizing clients reduce the stigma attached to the “oldest profession
in the world” and does criminalization of clients improve the well-being
of actors involved? It is timely, therefore, that Feminist Economics should
come back to such questions with an open attitude in light of new
evidence.
3
ARTICLE
NEW FEMINIST ECONOMICS RESEARCH ON SEX WORK:
THE SPECIAL ISSUE
The six contributions included in this special issue of Feminist Economics
were selected for this purpose from over forty abstracts that we, the guest
editors, received in answer to a call we conceived in 2005 and finally
launched in 2013. In keeping with the international spirit of the journal,
the studies cover countries spanning three continents – Asia, Europe, and
Africa – and offer disciplinary perspectives ranging from the outlook and
methodology typical of economists to that of ethnographers, sociologists,
and social policy analysts.
The more economic-oriented contributions focus on specific questions:
the importance of stigma and risk attitudes for the demand for paid sex in
a rich country like the UK, where data from representative surveys of sexual
attitudes allow to formally test hypotheses on the factors underpinning
demand, as well as draw broader policy inference (Della Giusta, Di
Tommaso, and Jewell 2016); the factors enhancing bargaining power
among brothel sex workers in India, distinguishing between actual and
perceived bargaining (Hui 2017); the importance of discrimination for
entering sex work among a virtually unknown subgroup of Italian sex
workers – transgender and transsexual people (Botti and D’Ippoliti 2016).
Maite Verhoeven and Barbra van Gestel (2016) take a more direct policy
stance, showing that the Dutch model of legalization actually stopped short
of regularizing “ancillary” services that sex workers depend on, with the
consequence of eroding the bargaining power for the latter. The idea is
that any study of the economic conditions of sex workers is distorted or
incomplete if it does not take on board analysis of spin-off services such
as taxi drivers, accountants, errand boys, and so on. Two studies focus on
specific subgroups of sex workers, and in both cases, economic questions
are pursued from an essentially ethnographic perspective: Paul W. Mathews
(2017) investigates the experience of Asian girls selling digital sexual
performances in the Philippines, while Sine Plambech (2016) studies
migrant sex workers in the trafficking circuit in Nigeria. Plambech takes
the idea of examining the spin-offs of the sex industry one step further
by analyzing the overlapping “economies” generated by the trafficking of
migrant women from Nigeria to Europe. Mathews takes the reader into
novel forms of sex work like cam modeling, showing how Information
and Communication Technology (ICT) may paradoxically bring back
exploitative forms of piece-rate payment.
Despite the diversity of questions, regional backgrounds, and research
methodologies, the six studies are woven together by two main threads.
The first retraces and revisits the issue of the agency of sex workers, while
the second pursues the meaning and the role of the stigma associated with
sex work. Following these threads and building on the evidence and the
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analysis advanced by the six studies, in this contribution we contend that
theoretical and policy debates are dominated by misleading dichotomies
regarding both agency and stigma. Sex workers are seen either as free to
choose, or as victims. Sex for pay is seen to carry stigma in opposition to
other work that supposedly does not. Such dichotomous views inevitably
lead to a stark policy opposition between legalizing and criminalizing the
sex industry.
We contend instead that both agency and stigma come in degrees.
Concerning agency, the contributions in this volume can be used to
illustrate the idea of a continuum of contractual arrangements with respect
to the ability of sex workers to influence the terms of exchange – earnings,
working conditions, hours of work, choice of clients, choice of services, and
so on. The same contributions indicate, moreover, that sex work is more
stigmatized at the lower end of the market also because it is more brawn
than brain work, and the more brawny it is, the stronger the stigma. This
feeds a process of segmentation that has been largely overlooked in the
economic literature up to now.
In view of this evidence, we conclude, current policies toward sex work
need to be reconsidered. Recognizing that both agency and stigma can be
placed along a continuum depending on the segment and the organization
of the sex industry reinforces available evidence that the lower the agency
that is allowed in a given segment, the higher the stigma that is attached.
Any policy affecting agency may therefore be expected to affect stigma,
and conversely. Regulating sex for pay as any other form of work need not
maximize agency if it does not succeed in eradicating stigma. Conversely,
the mounting support for criminalization of clients might well reflect
adversely on the well-being of sex workers, as it is feared to be pushing
sex work online and underground where the space for agency, as well as
supporting interventions, risks being considerably restricted.
A semantic caveat is warranted before proceeding any further. Like the
authors of the studies included here, we generally use the term “sex work”
in lieu of “prostitution” in order to avoid stigmatizing our object of analysis.
An additional reason is that sex work covers a range of activities that may
not be universally considered prostitution; for example, cam modeling. At
the same time, we have used and will continue to use the term prostitution
when this is needed to engage in a discussion with the literature, respecting
the terminology that has been used in recent debates, as evidenced at the
start of this piece.
THE POLICY DEBATE
Some of the questions we raised above in relation to the resolution passed
by the European Parliament are rather old, but all of them remain topical
for the policy debate that is raging worldwide, and in Europe in particular.
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While the debate goes on, staunch supporters of the Swedish model believe
they can confidently identify “right” and “wrong” policy actions for Europe.
Meanwhile, on the opposite side of the Atlantic, increasing concern with
trafficking and violence against women has neither produced a new policy
approach nor changed traditional stances with respect to sex work. What is
termed prostitution remains illegal in the US, where the issue of trafficking
for sexual exploitation has been increasingly conflated with that of sex work
in the public discourse (Anderson and Davidson 2003; Doezema 2010).
Conflation has made it easier to portray policies to fight trafficking as being
also appropriate to tackle sex work, with the result of further legitimizing
the legal ban on the latter. Before addressing the questions this volume
focuses on, we therefore provide a brief up-to-date review of topical policy
controversies in light of the support they received from recent empirical
evidence.
Eva-Maria Euchner and Christof Knill (2015) trace the evolution of
regulation of sex for pay in Western Europe since the 1960s and note
that while until the late 1990s national rules converged on the paradigm
of “permission without recognition” (prohibition of brothels and profit-
oriented third party activity but allowing activity in flats and on streets), a
marked change has since occurred, with countries diverging substantially.
Germany, the Netherlands, and Greece have moved toward acknowledging
sex work as a regular job, whereas Sweden, Norway, and Finland have
hardened their stance, instead aiming to eradicate sex work as a form of
violence. In the first group of countries, the consideration of sex work as
legitimate labor has led to lifting bans on outdoor and indoor sex work
subject to compliance with regulations (Netherlands since 2000, Germany
since 2002). Sex workers are entitled to a number of employment-related
protections under the law, and local authorities are required to ensure that
brothels are suitably licensed and operating in accordance with relevant
health and safety requirements. The abolitionist model, conversely, seeks
to prohibit sex work, facilitate exit, and punish clients and has been applied
in varying degrees in the US and, more recently, Sweden, Norway, and
Finland. In Sweden, to obtain a casual sexual relationship for payment is
an offense, punishable by a fine or imprisonment for up to six months.
Both outdoor and indoor sex work are prohibited, although only the clients
are criminalized. As a result, the spotlight here shines squarely on the
purchaser of commercial sex and on criminalizing his role in creating
demand for the sex industry.
A key rationale behind the resolution adopted by the European
Parliament is that prostitution is an essential manifestation of male violence
against women, which in turn means that those who sell sex should
not themselves be punished since they are victims rather than criminals.
True gender equality, it is argued, is attainable only when men are no
longer permitted to buy, sell, and exploit women in prostitution, and the
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Swedish government has coupled this legislative initiative with a number of
outreach programs designed to assist women who wish to leave the industry.
Intermediate options continue to exist, as exemplified by the approach of
decriminalization adopted for example by New Zealand, where a range
of offenses related to selling sex, such as soliciting, brothel-keeping, and
procuring intercourse, have been decriminalized since 2003. Brothels are
not subjected to any specific state licensing system but are governed by the
usual employment and health regulations that apply to other businesses.
Soliciting has been decriminalized, and there are no legal impediments to
recruiting clients in public bars or hotels. In passing these reforms, the
New Zealand government emphasized that its aim was not to legitimize
prostitution but to offer to those who worked in the industry an improved
level of protection and to eradicate the barriers to women’s exiting sex work
that may be created by a criminal conviction.
The effects of the different regulatory regimes on the size of the market
and the welfare of those involved have been widely studied, although
the lack of reliable data is often mentioned as a significant obstacle. For
example, it has been argued that women working in toleration zones or
regulated brothels (in the Netherlands or Germany, for example) are
now less marginalized and both personally and financially better off than
they were previously (Euchner and Knill 2015). However, it has also been
observed that many sex workers in Germany remain unregistered – often
for tax reasons – and that the Dutch experience suggests that the transition
to a license-based regime has had negative side effects (Cho, Dreher,
and Neumayer 2013). In particular, establishing regulatory systems and
policing toleration zones has imposed hefty demands on state agencies,
and it has been suggested that the most vulnerable women (that is, those
with irregular migration status or drug addictions) have been pushed into
illegal sectors where there is no protection. There have been problems in
finding a suitable location for toleration zones, and it has been argued that
many men who purchase sex – preferring to remain anonymous – will be
reluctant to frequent more visible areas, creating inevitable demand for
unregulated arenas.
While offering the benefits associated with the reduction of stigma
attached to sex work and the greater visibility of sex workers (which is
thought to render them less vulnerable to abuse), it has been argued that
decriminalization may offer the added advantage of limiting state intrusion
into the private lives of sex workers and allows them greater flexibility in
their working practices (Della Giusta and Munro 2008). As critics point
out, however, the downside of this flexibility is a lack of regulation that
may permit abuses to go unchecked. In fact, no agreement exists on the
consequences of decriminalization on demand: the New Zealand Ministry
of Justice (2008) reports that demand has fallen, while Melissa Farley
(2010) suggests it has increased but cannot provide supporting evidence.
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Similarly, supporters of the abolitionist approach cite its impact on
demand. At a cross-country level, Cho, Dreher, and Neumayer (2013)
show evidence that legalization is associated with increased human
trafficking. However, Joyce Outshoorn (2005) rounds up the debate
between abolitionism and legalization, arguing that women’s movements
will have to come to terms with the realities of international migration
and redefine the interests of women when addressing the old question of
sex work and its historical link to trafficking. Concerning the demand of
sex work in Sweden and neighboring countries, supporters of the Nordic
model claim that there has been a marked decline in the number of sex
workers on Swedish streets, but there is also evidence that online sexual
services for pay increased considerably, and that there has been cross-
border displacement too. One of the risks of abolitionism is that it may
simply force relocation to less visible sites in which sex workers may be
at increased risk of abuse, or drawn into a more competitive market in
which they have to cut prices or offer riskier services to secure the business
of a decreasing client base. Controversy rages over which effect has been
prevalent in Sweden and neighboring countries, as reported in the UK’s
Home Affairs Committee prostitution enquiry report (2016) and in the
Amnesty International report (2016) about Norway.
In fact, both Amnesty International and The Economist have recently
reached similar conclusions on policies regarding sex markets. In August
2015, the International Council of Amnesty International (2015) decided
to back complete decriminalization of sex work. Decriminalizing sex work,
they reasoned, would be better for the health and safety of sex workers and
better protect their human rights. Amnesty’s International Council took
care to declare opposition to criminalizing sex work for both clients and
sex workers. Criminalization both on the demand side (clients) and supply
side (sex workers) implies pushing this “market” into the hidden economy,
increasing the risks sex workers face. Perhaps less predictably, The Economist
(2014), in a report on paid sex, also argued for a complete liberalization of
the market and against criminalization policies. Robert Skidelsky (2016), a
prominent Keynesian economist and member of the House of Lords, has
joined the cause. He recently advocated against criminalization and in favor
of regulation of the market to protect the health and safety of sex workers.
How does the present collection of studies contribute to this debate?
While all of the studies are concerned with policy, most of them do not
address policy alternatives head-on. However, taken together, they provide
conceptual and empirical support for at least two arguments bearing on
the debate. The first is that the criminalization of clients and certain
anti-trafficking policies such as deportation and rescue of trafficked sex
workers have important unintended consequences that limit the agency
and well-being of sex workers; that is, these policies become part of the
problem rather than a solution. Conversely, legalization policies have not
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fully resolved the tendency for parts of the sex work industry to remain
informal and to stay out of reach of regulating authorities, suggesting that
intermediate regimes (for instance, decriminalization without legalization)
may well be those that afford more room for maneuver. As we shall discuss
in the following, both arguments impinge on how agency and stigma
should be understood and the way they interplay in a highly segmented
market that eschews a one-size-fits-all regulatory approach.
THE CONTINUUM OF AGENCY
Feminist economists have long debated the issue of agency. The pioneering
work of Nancy Folbre (1994) focuses on questions of identity within the
collective structures of society and on rules and norms that position the
individual within a social hierarchy. Women’s agency is exercised within
a system of norms and rules that identifies her social status. So in the
context of sex work, an escort has more agency than a street-based sex
worker. To this extent, Amartya Sen provides a very important contribution
to this debate with his work on cooperative conflict (1987, 1990), where
he argues that bargaining models do not fully capture the nature of
conflict within the households and therefore the nature of agency. In
his view, women’s contribution is systematically undervalued because it is
not “perceived” as valuable (by both women themselves and men). Sen
draws attention to the importance of the external circumstances (that
is, labor market, family laws), which can influence the bargaining and
negotiation within the household. Feminist economists have extended
Sen’s argument to take into account how norms and institutions shape the
power structures that limit women’s agency (Agarwal 1997; Kabeer 1999;
van Staveren and Odebode 2007). The Feminist Economics special issue on
voice and agency takes a clear stance within feminist economists’ debates
(Gammage, Kabeer, and van der Meulen Rodgers 2016). In particular,
Gammage, Kabeer and van der Meulen Rodgers claim that more resources
to collective expressions of agency in markets, supporting cooperatives and
unions will be essential if we are to improve the terms and conditions of
women’s employment. Their work on agency in markets is of particular
importance for sex markets because women’s voices are rarely heard
in these markets.
Agency takes central stage in practically every study in this collection.
On a general level, the different contributions convey the same message,
namely that sex workers express choice and agency to different degrees
and in different ways and contexts, including when they operate within
trafficking circuits. The specific way agency is conceptualized and found
relevant in the different studies advances our understanding by illustrating
that agency comes in degrees whether it is seen as “informed” enrollment
into a system of indentured sex work migration, choice of occupational
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identity within the sex work industry, access to credit, or more general
ability to make economic choices under constraint.
Two clear examples are the respective studies on Asian cam girls
and Nigerian young women migrating to Europe to sell sexual services.
Plambech (2016) notes how the city of Benin in Nigeria has acquired a
reputation for being a trafficking hub for young women directed primarily
to Europe where they work under a “madame.” In her fieldwork in Benin
City, she interviewed some twenty-five to thirty women and their families,
as well as key informants. All but one of the women in her study knew
they were going to sell sex in Europe, which is at odds with the idea that
trafficking implies deceit or force. Reportedly, the same women knew they
would work under a madame, and that they might need two or three
years to repay the debt incurred with the “traffickers” who arranged travel
documents and transportation to Europe. Often the women themselves –
or their families – had contacted the traffickers to be “assisted” in their
migration project. Plambech argues that one should conceptualize the
relationship between traffickers, madams, and sex workers as “indentured
sex work migration,” not trafficking. Her contention echoes the conclusion
that Smirti Rao and Christina Presenti reached based on their analysis of
trafficking in the countries of source:
We see merit in the case for addressing both (trafficking and illegal
migration) under the umbrella of what could be termed “trafficking-
like practices” to better capture both the immense constraints placed
upon the movement of people from the developing world and the
resultant ease with which voluntary shades into involuntary. (2012:
258)
Agency has different connotations for Asian cam models who perform
various sexual acts in front of a camera to entertain paying clients. Mathews
(2017) carried out participant-observation of and interviews with cam
models in the Philippines over five years, principally using one major
interactive Asian cam modeling site. In his findings, cam models not only
make choices in the way economists normally understand (that is, they
voluntarily take up this activity in order to earn money), but identity
is also involved. Mathews argues that in the Philippines, mobility across
different segments of the market for sexual services is low despite the
fact that earnings differentials can be large between, say, street walkers,
masseuses, bar girls, and cam models. One of the reasons for low mobility,
the argument goes, is that choice of type of sex work is or becomes a
matter of identity. Because they sell virtual sex, cam models do not think of
themselves as prostitutes. They perform behind a screen, whereas what they
see as prostitution entails physical contact. Technology helps them build a
self-image of sexual performer in opposition to an image as sex worker.1
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And this very identity makes them reluctant to move to other segments of
sex work such as massage parlors where they could earn more.
Della Giusta, Di Tommaso, and Jewell (2016), Botti and D’Ippoliti
(2016), and Hui (2017; all in this volume) understand agency as
economic choice. As is well-known, in neoclassical economic models,
choice is exercised subject to limitations in the material resources and the
opportunities available to the individual. Thus, choice is never completely
free. While concurring with this statement, Hui (2017) construes the
concept of bargaining power in the framework of the capability approach
developed by Sen. She argues that there are two distinct notions of
bargaining power: one that is based on objective bargaining power
and another that is based on subjective bargaining power. Both are
rooted in the cooperative conflict concept introduced by Sen (1987,
1990), where he distinguishes between “individual contribution” and
“perceived contribution”: individual contribution could be different from
the perception that each individual has of their own contribution to
the household. If, for example, the woman’s housework (individual
contribution) is perceived less valuable by the woman herself (perceived
contribution), then the outcome of the bargaining within the household
would be less favorable for her. Hui goes on to argue “that there may be a
difference between the sex worker’s actual bargaining power and what she
perceives her bargaining power to be” (2017: 50). Drawing on primary data
from brothel-based sex workers in the red light districts of the Indian cities
of Delhi and Kolkata, Hui measures both the objective and the subjective
(perceived) bargaining power of these women, and she finds that these
two dimensions are not only different but are also affected by different
constraints. She utilizes the concept of financial agency – agency to open
a bank account or to borrow money – as one of the indicators of objective
bargaining power.
Critics who deny agency in sex work invoke precisely economic
limitations and constraints to make their point. The no-agency-under-
constraints argument contends that, even when women may appear to
voluntarily enter sex work, empirical evidence shows that poverty and
lack of opportunities drive the entry, and hence it cannot be considered
genuine choice. On a philosophical level, however, the same argument can
be applied to any kind of work, not only sex work. Marx used it to argue
that the labor contract is not a genuine contract inasmuch as one of the
contractual parties – the worker – has no alternative means of survival but to
take up wage employment. But if we take Marx’s work seriously, we should
advocate the end of wage labor, not simply the eradication of sex work.
The contribution by Botti and D’Ippoliti (2016) questions the no-agency-
under-constraints argument in a rather indicative case. Exploiting an ad
hoc survey of trans people conducted in Italy in 2010, the authors examine
the choice of entering sex work among trans people in Italy, a group that is
11
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portrayed as suffering from serious discrimination. In their account, none
of the sex workers they interviewed declared that sex work was the first
job they found, and all were much more likely to declare that it was the
“only” job they found. While this seems to lend strong support to the thesis
that sex work can never be “chosen,” a closer look at other findings in
the study reveals that entering sex work as a second or third best choice
should not be confused with total absence of agency. Botti and D’Ippoliti
estimate the probability of entering sex work as a function of, among other
things, income to capture the pull effect that is exercised by the fact that
average earnings in the sex industry are higher than the average earnings
in the reference labor market. And they found that prospective earnings
matter. Low employability and high discrimination – both of which depress
opportunities for employment – were also found to matter: in fact, they
were found to be the most significant factors pushing trans people to enter
sex work. In plain words, Italian trans people interviewed by the authors
entered sex work largely because their opportunities were curtailed by
low employability and high discrimination but partly also because the sex
service industry offers above average earnings. Is not this evidence of at least
some agency?
This is the crux of the matter: agency comes in degrees. The case of
“regular” sex work known as “window prostitution” in Amsterdam makes
this same point from a converse perspective. Verhoeven and van Gestel
(2016) used police files of Dutch criminal investigations into human
trafficking in Amsterdam’s Red Light District to study window prostitution.
In this branch of the industry, sex workers provide (full) sexual services
in a room where the window serves as a “negotiation venue” as well as a
“shop window.” They demonstrate that “[i]n principle, sex workers work
independently: they are self-employed, and they negotiate the price and
the services provided to their clients on their own” (Verhoeven and van
Gestel 2016: 112). Since sex work is fully legal in the Netherlands, the
workers in window prostitution are regulated, taxed, and inspected like
other self-employed workers. According to the law, they enjoy full agency.
In reality, however, they depend on a host of services from tax drivers,
pimps, errand boys, brothel owners, bodyguards, or accountants, all of
whom tend to work informally, partly because clients value anonymity to
avoid being stigmatized. Such informality, however, tends to expose sex
workers to exploitation since it makes it difficult to prove or prevent abuse
or to enforce penalties. This reduces the workers’ bargaining power and,
more generally, their agency.
If agency comes in degrees, the idea of a continuum of choice is
more appropriate than popular dichotomies like forced versus voluntary
sex work. This idea is not new in the literature about sex work and
trafficking. Plambech, in this volume, situates her Nigerian sex workers
along a migration and trafficking continuum where “the precise point at
12
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which tolerable forms of sex work migration end and human trafficking
begins will vary according to political and moral values not easily captured
by legal definitions” (2016: 139). Giulia Garofalo (2015) uses the idea
of a continuum of power asymmetries to conceptualize sex work as a
“positional” good. Drawing from the work of anthropologist Paola Tabet
(2004), Francesca Bettio and Tushar K. Nandi (2010) posit a continuum
of contractual arrangements in sex work. In their view a woman’s degree
of agency, including her capacity to influence the terms of the exchange,
contributes to defining breaches in this continuum, that is, meaningful
distinctions between (implicit or explicit) contractual arrangements placed
along the scale. In our view, the contributions in this volume can be
used to illustrate the idea of a continuum of contractual arrangements
with respect to the ability to influence the terms of exchange – earnings,
working conditions, hours of work, choice of clients, choice of services,
and so on. Indentured sex work migration as found in Nigeria might be
located at the low agency end of the continuum, while window prostitution
in Amsterdam might plausibly sit at the opposite end, with brothel work
in Kolkata positioned somewhere in the middle. Our interest here does
not lie in how exactly the different arrangements can be ranked along a
continuum – such a measurement exercise falls clearly outside the scope of
this contribution – but in arguing that they belong in a continuum.
STIGMA
Like agency, stigma too comes in degrees. One reason, we argue here,
is that not only does stigma affect earnings and working conditions,
as some economists theorize, but earnings and working conditions may
affect stigma in turn, in a complex two-way causation process that sustains
segmentation in the industry.
Neoclassical economic theorizing has embraced the view that stigma
and sex work are inextricably woven together across time and places.
However, the focus is on the effects of stigma on demand for paid sex,
prices or earnings of sex workers, rather than the way the former is socially
constructed – that is, why stigma arises in the first place or which forms it
takes. Yet, several articles in this volume indicate that earnings and social
conditions are important ingredients in the social construction of stigma,
with the tendency for the latter to decrease as earnings rise and working
conditions improve. This feeds a process of segmentation that has been
overlooked by neoclassical economic theorizing, but is well supported by
the studies in this collection, and is rather more linked to the classic
sociological theories of stigma. The latter describe the relational process
of attribution and acceptance of stigma (Goffman 1963), leaving room for
agency to play an important role, and one that can account for the varying
experiences of individuals in the sex industry.
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To explore why let us start from Lena Edlund and Evelyn Korn’s (2002)
first theorization of sex work. Their theory is primarily concerned with
stigma on the supply side, where sex workers are prevented from marrying
because stigma acts as a barrier that separates out the market for “non-
reproductive sex” from the marriage market for reproductive sex. In this
model, stigma allows reproductive sex to live in harmony – read: market
equilibrium – with non-reproductive sex. As long as the lifetime returns of
offering non-reproductive services as a sex worker are broadly in line with
that of offering reproductive services as a wife, the two markets can happily
coexist, provided they do not mingle. The question of what would happen if
they mingled is assumed not to matter for the economics of sex work. This
assumption is a characteristic of traditional mainstream economics: stigma
is like preferences or beliefs, and it is not the task of economists to query
either.
Marina Della Giusta, Maria Laura Di Tommaso, and Steinar Strøm (2009)
narrow down the concept of stigma to a more “tangible” loss of reputation,
but at the same time broaden its range of action: stigma restrains clients
from buying sex on the demand side while also influencing conditions and
earnings of sex workers on the supply side. They allow for reverse causation
in their model, whereby stigma may be affected by demand or supply of
sex work in its turn – that is, it is weakened when the market expands
significantly. Reverse causation says something about the process of social
construction of stigma; for example, if a larger market weakens stigma, then
the latter must be sustained by some idea of deviance. Within the confines
of the model that Della Giusta, Di Tommaso, and Strøm (2009) propose,
however, it does not ultimately matter which “deviance” is being stigmatized
or why.
Hui (2017), in this volume, is interested in how stigma matters on the
supply side: in her framework stigma influences bargaining power, rather
than separating markets, and one of her key findings is that perceived
bargaining power is affected by stigma more than actual bargaining power,
thus providing a more explicit understanding of the link between stigma
and agency. In the same vein, Plambech (2016) illustrates how, for Nigerian
women involved in the trafficking flows of sex workers to Europe, being
deported back to Benin city from Europe carries higher stigma than
having been (trafficked as) sex workers. The reason, Plambech argues,
is that deportation is equated with downward social mobility since, after
deportation, former migrants can no longer support their family with their
remittances. Although social status cannot be entirely equated with high
income or wealth, Plambech’s evidence hints at the possibility that sex
work is less stigmatized the higher the earnings it commands (a point we
elaborate further below).
The story told by Plambech may also be interpreted as severe stigma
signaling conditions socially perceived as economic failure. Think of how
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poverty has been stigmatized in the past and still is among some groups
in society. Transposed onto sex work, the parallel with poverty means that
if individuals enter sex work to earn a livelihood, this is a sign that they
belong to the downtrodden, those with lower chances of success. But if the
same individuals can make enough money out of sex work to climb the
social ladder, this inevitably lowers the stigma attached to their persona.
Put differently, the degree of stigma attached to sex work may well signal a
sex worker’s position within the economic hierarchy.
Mathews (2017) highlights a different side of stigma in sex work, which
may reinforce the idea of a social hierarchy component. Cam models,
he argues, are able to construe their identity of being performers rather
than sex workers because they have no physical contact with the clients.
Identity matters for economic choices among cam models: as noted, they
are reluctant to move to other segments of the sex industry where they
could earn more also because they wish to defend their identity. Their
perception is that sex workers who do the “real” (physical) job are more
stigmatized than they are, performing sex behind a camera. The point here
is that cam models’ perception fit the century’s old dichotomy between
brawn work and brain work, with the former enjoying less social status
than the latter, though not necessarily lower earnings. Applied to the sex
industry this dichotomy indicates that sex work attracts stigma also because
it is more brawn than brain work. And the more brawny it is, the stronger
the stigma.
Botti and D’Ippoliti provide yet another piece of anecdotal evidence in
support of this idea. In their recollection:
starting from May 2009, the Italian political debate was dominated
by allegations that Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi regularly hosted
parties with (occasionally underage) sex workers. The then-majority
conservative party reacted by both denying the accusations as well
as trying to reduce the social stigma attached to sex work. Part of
such a large-scale communication strategy was the systematic use of
a less value-ridden term than prostitute, namely “escort.” (Botti and
D’Ippoliti 2016: 84)
This hints to the fact that stigma is weaker or less consequential for escort
girls, the best paid segment of the industry. Not only do they earn enough
money to buy off some of the social standing that stigma erodes, but,
arguably, they also sell sexual services where brain work weighs more
than in other branches of the industry. They are expected to perform
physical sex but also to entertain a richer or more sophisticated clientele.
This requires social skills, hence brain work of a type. Social skills are
part of any sex worker’s job, but, arguably, quality and quantity may
be higher for escorts. Indeed, Maria Laura Di Tommaso, Isilda Shima,
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Steinar Strøm, and Francesca Bettio (2009), analyzing the well-being of
sexually exploited trafficked women, found that fees for sexual services
were strongly correlated with women’s level of education. Women with high
levels of education were paid 44 percent more than women with low levels
of education.
If all of this has some grounding, then it raises a number of questions
about the existing theorization of sex work. In particular, can stigma
and prices or earnings from sexual services be modeled as if they were
independent from one another (as Edlund and Korn [2002] do)? Stigma,
prices, earnings, and working conditions vary greatly across types of sex
work. The industry is known to be highly segmented as can be gauged
from even the few studies included in this collection. In such a segmented
market, do higher earnings go along with reduced stigma as the case of
escorts would suggest, or are they being traded off for less stigma, as the case
of cam models would indicate? And is there mobility between segments? If
not, what stands in the way?
To see how important it may be to account for segmentation in the
analysis of sex work, consider the study by Della Giusta, Di Tommaso, and
Jewell (2016) in this collection. The study uses the 2001 British National
Survey of Sexual Attitudes and Lifestyles (Natsal; a representative sample of
British men) to test econometrically the theoretical framework introduced
by Della Giusta, Di Tommaso, and Strøm (2009). A key question the study
addresses is whether and how strongly stigma reduces the demand for paid
sex. After controlling for a host of variables, Della Giusta, Di Tommaso, and
Jewell (2016) find that men with higher occupational status demand less
paid sex. In their words: “[i]ndividuals with a professional or managerial
position are 9 percentage points less likely to pay for sex than unskilled
individuals” (2016: 38). This result is seen to strongly support one of the
central claims of the model.
Della Giusta, Di Tommaso, and Jewell (2016) also report that an earlier
attempt (Della Giusta et al. 2009) to test the prediction of the model had
given inconclusive results on the role of stigma. They justify the difference
in the two sets of results with the shortcomings of the data used for
the earlier attempt. In light of the preceding discussion, however, this
discrepancy of results may be given a different interpretation. Among male
clients, higher occupational status goes along with good earnings, hence
with ability to pay for more expensive sexual services, such as escorts instead
of street-based sex workers. If it is true that sex work is less stigmatized at the
top of the market, then two opposite effects would be at work for skilled,
high-earning male clients. On the one hand, they face higher reputational
costs than unskilled blue collars when they are caught to demand paid sex,
but on the other hand they can afford to demand the kind of sex work that
tends to be less stigmatized. Which effect prevails is an empirical question.
This empirical indeterminacy is an example of how difficult it may be to
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generalize results when the segmentation of the sex market is not explicitly
accounted for.
CONCLUSION
This collection of studies on sex work and trafficking can be seen as a
complement to two previous special issues of Feminist Economics: Gender
and Migration (18[2]; 2012) and Voice and Agency (22[1]; 2016). All three
issues are linked through the concept of agency. This contribution has
shown that agency is an empirical and conceptual lynchpin of the collection
of studies in this issue. Agency comes through and varies with subjective as
well as objective bargaining power (Hui 2017); legalization, as currently
enforced, need not imply full agency (Verhoeven and van Gestel 2016);
failing to see agency (however limited) leads to mistaking indentured forms
of sex work migration for trafficking (Plambech 2016); agency comes as
choice of the type of sex work (Mathews 2017); agency is implied by any
economic choice, but is always constrained (Botti and D’Ippoliti 2016; Della
Giusta, Di Tommaso, and Jewell 2016).
Agency is also a major issue in the ongoing debate within government
and policymaking circles as well as among scholars about the legalization,
decriminalization, and criminalization of sex work. Supporters of
criminalization (of sex workers or clients) tend to undervalue the issue of
agency and portray sex workers as victims. Supporters of decriminalization
or legalization tend to stress the value of the choice of those involved
(Euchner and Knill 2015).
The studies in this special issue lend support to an alternative
stance in the policy debate: because agency comes in degrees, the
idea of a continuum of choice is more appropriate than the popular
dichotomy of voluntary versus forced sex work. A stark opposition between
criminalization and legalization therefore imposes a false dichotomy on a
much more complex issue with the unintended consequence of hindering
agency and the well-being of sex workers.
The other main theme of this special issue is the role that stigma attached
to sex workers and clients plays in shaping the supply of and demand for sex
work. Stigma is also viewed here to fit a continuum when applied to the sex
industry. A relatively neglected dimension of this continuum that this issue
brings out is that sex work attracts stigma because it is more brawn than
brain work, and the more brawny it is, the more stigma it carries. So, escort
girls in Italy or cam girls in the Philippines suffer or perceive less stigma
also because their work is perceived as more brain than brawn (Botti and
D’Ippoliti 2016; Mathews 2017). At the top of the market, sex work is less
stigmatized.
Recognizing that both agency and stigma come in degrees lends
credibility to the suggestion that the higher the stigma that is imposed,
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the lower the agency that is allowed. This trend is found particularly for
sex workers in Delhi and Kolkata (Hui 2017), where girls who are already
stigmatized due to their caste have less subjective and objective bargaining
power. It is also the basis of the theoretical model of sex work by Della
Giusta, Di Tommaso, and Strøm (2009), and is confirmed by the paradox
highlighted by Plambech. Nigerian sex workers who are returned to Nigeria
to be “freed” from the trafficking network that brought them to Europe
suffer higher stigma than the sex workers who managed to stay abroad
because inability to earn adds to the status of “prostitutes” in the algebra
of stigma.
To the extent that agency and stigma are negatively correlated, any
policy that affects stigma will have consequences on agency and vice versa.
This calls for reconsideration of current approaches toward sex work.
Legalization policies that do not succeed in eradicating stigma cannot
be assumed to ensure full agency. Conversely, criminalization of clients
raises serious concern about adverse unintended consequences for the
agency and well-being of sex workers. If criminalization increases the
stigma associated with sex work, sex workers will lose agency (see Amnesty
International [2016] report for Norway), but if sex workers are empowered
through collective action or associations, then stigma may well decrease.
Only time, and careful monitoring, will tell.
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NOTE
1 Economists may be tempted to explain this differently, for instance, as a trade-off
between better working conditions and lower earnings, especially if they adhere to
the hypothesis of compensating differentials. However, absence of physical contact is
only one of the working conditions that should be factored in. Other conditions may
not be so desirable: as Mathews documents, for example, models have to spend very
long, unpaid, hours enticing clients and with no certainty of inducing them into paid,
private sessions.
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